Some years ago, when it still seemed possible to mount a defense if only we could just unmask the enemy, a retired senior intelligence officer passed along an essay about Henry Kissinger by "one Charles Viar," whom the retired officer described as a friend of the late James Jesus Angleton. It is called "The Curious Case of Henry Alfred Kissinger." I don't know the author; I don't know if his essay was ever published. My friend, however, thought it was worth reading. And so it is, if only for Viar's claim:
After his enforced departure from the Agency in 1973, Angleton publicly stated with qualified precision that Kissinger was “objectively, a Soviet agent.” But for a man who had once trained at Harvard Law School, objective and witting were entirely different things. He remained agnostic until his death in 1987.
I think I just heard an echoing gun from the battle, or, perhaps, Phony War, over Harry Hopkins.
Viar's essay presents an elegantly constructed biographical study of Kissinger, his origins as a poor refugee of Nazi Germany who arrived in New York City as a teenager with his family; his stint in the armed forces during World War II, which included courageous service at the Battle of the Bulge; his elevation into military intelligence and later guidance to Harvard through the offices of a man we might call "one Fritz Kraemer," an older German refugee of a similiarly provocative effect. It was at Harvard where Kissinger would eventually be "discovered" and elevated by Harvard historian, later-JFK-advisor and professional liberal Arthur Schlesinger Jr, who was really a socialist who did not wish to be known as a "Socialist." I make this last remark, and with insufficient tact, to indicate that had young war/intelligence veteran Kissinger spread his wings as an anti-communist in the late 1940s, just as Whittaker Chambers et al were spilling at least some of the beans on the communist/socialist subversion of the US government, it is safe to assume he would not have been taken up by Harvard or Schlesinger, or, later, the Council on Foreign Relations or the Rockefeller network -- David, Nelson and more, very much including Rockefeller banking interests.
The rest is history? No, the rest is spider webs, bum steers, and a theatrical kind of darkness that descends with the curtain as we stagger up the aisle into a blizzard of Kissnger obituaries which obscure what is most intriguing and alarming about this disastrous architect of the "new world order."
Here is a reminder from "The Curious Case of Henry Alfred Kissinger":
Kissinger had fallen under suspicion long before public doubts as to his allegiance ever arose. Lingering questions regarding Kissinger’s inexplicable success in post-war Germany and his unreported trip – or trips – to Moscow invited close scrutiny, as did his increasing access to classified information as a government consultant. During the closing years of the 1950’s, a Polish intelligence officer by the name of Col. Michael Goleniewski provided the CIA with thousands of pages of Polish and Soviet Bloc intelligence documents, and the identities of scores of Soviet and Bloc spies while still serving as an agent-in-place. After arriving in the United States in January of 1961, he identified Kissinger as a Soviet agent and provided plausible details as to his alleged recruitment. That Goleniewski later went mad has encouraged some to discount his testimony – and others to suspect his sanity was deliberately destroyed by drugs, to discredit his claims.
Whatever the actual truth, Goleniewski’s accusation gained additional credence in December of 1961, when KGB Major Anatoily Golitsyn defected to the United States. A graduate of the KGB’s High Intelligence School, Golitsyn had been a NATO analyst before being assigned to the KGB’s strategic planning unit. In the course of his career he had been exposed to a wealth of Soviet intelligence data, which he exchanged for asylum. Although Golitsyn’s analysis of Soviet strategy later provoked an enormous controversy, there was never any doubt as to the validity of the information he provided during his initial debriefing: he accurately detailed the massive Soviet penetrations of the French, German, and British foreign intelligence services, and revealed a high ranking penetration agent in the United States. In contrast to the Soviet penetrations of the European intelligence services, his knowledge of the American penetration was slight. The traitor was a naturalized citizen who had been born in Europe, and his last name began with “K.”
Although public reports of the investigation that followed have asserted that the “mole hunt” was confined to the CIA, the Agency’s Counterintelligence Staff cast a much wider net. In actual fact, the investigation reached deep into the Department of Defense, the State Department, and far beyond. Fritz Kraemer – who then held an important post in the Pentagon – fell under immediate suspicion, but was quickly cleared. His one time protégée was not.
X.
Suspicions continued to mount after Kissinger’s appointment as national security advisor. According to unconfirmed reports, President-elect Nixon dispatched Kissinger on a secret, post-election mission to Moscow to solicit Soviet support for his plan to end the Vietnam War. Although the story may be apocryphal, the mission is said to have been a catastrophic failure: after listening to Kissinger’s presentation, the Soviet leadership – which had thus far been reluctant to extend more than token aid to their North Vietnamese allies – decided to bleed the United States instead. Within a matter of weeks, massive amounts of Soviet weapons and supplies began flowing to North Vietnam through their Far Eastern port of Vladivostok. According to former
intelligence officers who believed the story to be true, Kissinger’s failure doomed America’s effort to defend South East Asia – and without exception, they also believed it was deliberate.
Similar suspicions arose regarding Kissinger’s efforts to negotiate a series of strategic arms limitation treaties, known respectively as SALT I and SALT II. Because Kissinger viewed these treaties as foundational for his larger policy of Détente, he was untroubled by the fact or the perception – depending upon one’s point of view – that they conferred an asymmetrical advantage upon the Soviets. Some American intelligence officers regarded the treaties as fool-hardy, while others thought them treasonous – interpretations that hardened after James Angleton, the CIA’s chief of counterintelligence, informed the U.S. Senate the Agency lacked the ability to verify Soviet compliance. Angleton was soon dismissed, and while public source accounts based upon “deep background” interviews and officially sanctioned leaks attributed this to his allegedly disruptive search for “Agent K,” the story is untrue. Angleton had spoken truth to power, the most heinous of Capitol crimes. For that, he was forced to walk the plank.
The story unfortunately continued long after Angleton slid beneath the waves. Angleton’s staff were transferred or fired, their files were shredded, and the counterintelligence function was redefined and redistributed. By the end of the 1970’s the CIA’s counterintelligence capability – then the only existing national counterintelligence capability – was so reduced that it no longer merited the name. By that time Kissinger had retired from government, Détente had collapsed, and the Cold War resumed in earnest. Whatever questions remained as to Kissinger’s loyalty became moot or nearly so; and in any event, what little evidence the CIA held against him had been long since destroyed.
XI.
For those familiar with Washington politics, it is entirely plausible to view Angleton’s dismissal and the evisceration of his staff as no more than an exercise in intra-governmental rivalry. Angleton’s testimony had threatened Kissinger’s policies, and with them, his power and position. From that same perspective, it is also possible to view the contretemps in terms of a courtier protecting his patron’s interests. Kissinger’s association with the Rockefeller family ran deep, and the Rockefellers’ had a vested interest in Détente. Because Chase Manhattan Bank had extended some tens of billions of dollars in loans to the Soviet Bloc, increased trade and commerce had become a form of surety.
But from a counterintelligence standpoint, these same events can be interpreted with equal plausibility in at least three other ways. One obvious interpretation is that of a powerful and highly placed penetration agent successfully protecting himself from exposure. Another is a successful Soviet provocation designed to sow discord within the U.S. policymaking elite through the dispatch of false defectors or – far more likely – the deliberate mis-briefing of officers suspected of disloyalty. A third possibility is the evidence is either misleading or entirely wrong for reasons other than those cited above. But in the absence of conclusive proof, it is impossible to ascertain the truth in any case. The debate will continue, perhaps for generations as historians sort through what remains of the data.
After his enforced departure from the Agency in 1973, Angleton publicly stated with qualified precision that Kissinger was “objectively, a Soviet agent.” But for a man who had once trained at Harvard Law School, objective and witting were entirely different things. He remained agnostic until his death in 1987.
Now more than three decades after Kissinger left government service, the lingering suspicions are far more important than the truth. For the inability of American counterintelligence to determine Kissinger’s bona fides both illustrates and underscores a systemic weakness that has haunted American counterintelligence efforts from their inception – quite specifically, the lack of an effective and reliable methodology capable of resolving these and other like questions within a reasonable timeframe, and with a high degree of confidence.
Within the realm of intelligence, analytical methodology has never attracted the attention or the talent it deserves. After he was recalled to the Agency in 1981, Angleton resumed work on a new methodology but it remained incomplete at the time of his death. Since then methodological efforts have languished, and this has been especially true with regard to counterintelligence. For that reason, on-going efforts to enhance America’s counterintelligence capabilities are unlikely to achieve their full potential. Questions of loyalty will continue to arise, suspicions will moot; the shadows of doubt will grow.
But like the Gypsy Maiden of lore, certainty will dance and twirl around the campfire. Beautiful, tantalizing and seductive – and ever beyond our reach.
All I know is Kissinger and Nixon stopped WWIII with China when they went there and invited their young brightest students to come to the US for education! They have leap frogged over the US. Then Nixon reportedly wanted to re-investigate the JFK assassination and he was ostracized by the FBI. It has been reported, Mr. Gray, Hoover's lover and second in command was deep throat and feed the WP the preplanned setup! The day after Hoover died his personal files on Congressman and etc. that he had in his home disappeared. I wonder why.
Joseph McCarthy was correct, but that was Then and It's "All Better" now that the Bolsheviks and Corporists/NWO Mother WEFer Banksters have quit covering up their collusions leading up to the 1918 Russian Coup & Revolution.